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Drainwater management strategies include source control, reuse, treatment, and 
evaporation ponds; questions of interest are efficient management, policy instruments, 
and sustainability.  A high level of source control is indicated absent reuse due to the 
relatively high cost of evaporation ponds; this is accomplished largely through high 
uniformity/high cost irrigation systems.  With reuse, the primary form of source control is 
reduction in land area devoted to freshwater production; the released land goes to reuse 
production.  Reuse appears as an economically promising solution to the drainage 
problem.  A high level of net returns is achieved while maintaining overall hydrologic 
balance in the system.   
 
Economic efficiency and hydrologic balance may be attained through pricing or market 
schemes.  With pricing, growers are charged for deep percolations flows, while reuse and 
evaporation pond operators are paid for extractions.  With markets, permit supply is 
generated by extractions from the water table, while permit demand is generated by deep 
percolation.  Competitive equilibrium exists, is efficient, and implies hydrologic balance.  
The analysis suggests that a high level of agricultural production may be possible for 
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Deep percolation flows are an inevitable consequence of irrigated agriculture.  While some 
flow below the root zone is desired to leach salts away from the roots, most flows are a product 
of a field’s nonuniform infiltration rate.  In the presence of impermeable strata underlying the 
irrigated field, these flows can build up and encroach into a crop’s root zone resulting in 
decreased yields and possibly eliminating production.  The threat of such production losses to 
irrigated agriculture is present in California’s San Joaquin Valley (SJV), a region consisting of 
nearly 5.6 million irrigated acres above an impervious clay layer.  Early efforts to solve this 
problem involved installing a system of drains that transported the saline water near the rootzone 
to streams or other water bodies.  Unfortunately, the drainage resulted in environmental 
damages, such as the bird deformities and fish kills at the Kesterson Reservoir in 1985, which 
subsequently lead to out-of-region discharge restrictions.  Currently, irrigated agriculture in this 
region is operating as a semi-closed basin; surface water is imported for irrigation but external 
drainage is either not allowed or is greatly restricted. 
Finding a solution to this drainage problem, a solution that maintains both agricultural 
productivity and environmental quality, requires consideration of a broad array of biophysical 
management options.  These options will likely include some combination of source control, 
drain water reuse, and in-region disposal methods.  Examples of source control options include 
more uniform irrigation systems and crop-switching.  Reusing the drainage water for crop 
production is another option, similar to source control, which can reduce waste emissions and 
conserve scarce freshwater supplies.  Finally, in-region disposal methods include options such as 
evaporation ponds and solar evaporators.  An understanding of both the relationships that exist 




though, to find the efficient solution among these various combinations. 
Numerous studies have investigated the impact of these options on production, drainage 
flows, and water use.  Dinar et al (1985) Caswell, Lichtenberg, and Zilberman (1990), and Dinar 
and Zilberman (1991), for example, investigated the implications of source control at the field-
level, while Dinar, Hatchett and Loehman (1991) and Posnikoff and Knapp (1996) evaluated 
source control at the farm and regional level.  Knapp et al. (1990b) and Shah, Zilberman, and 
Lichtenberg (1995) evaluated source control while accounting for the potential dynamics 
associated with the water table.  Studies that have investigated irrigation with saline water and/or 
reuse include (among many others) Feinerman (1983), Bresler, Yaron, and Segev (1983), 
Feinerman and Yaron (1983), Knapp and Dinar (1984), and Feinerman and Vaux (1984) at the 
field and farm-level within a static framework, and Yaron and Olian (1973), Yaron et al. (1980), 
Dinar and Knapp (1986), Dinar, Aillery, and Moore, and Wichelns (1999) within a dynamic 
framework. 
Studies using an integrated analysis of multiple strategies including source control, reuse, and 
disposal are much less numerous.  Knapp, Dinar, and Letey (1986) consider source control and 
reuse with evaporation ponds, yet irrigation technology is treated as exogenous.  Posnikoff and 
Knapp (1996) evaluate source control, reuse with agroforestry production, and evaporation 
ponds.  However, agroforestry does not currently appear viable in the SJV (Oster et al).  
Hatchett, Horner, and Howitt (1991) develop a detailed simulation model for drainage in the 
SJV.  Their model includes various source control methods and reuse, but not other in-region 
disposal options such as evaporation ponds.  Research investigating the ability of policy to 




tiered pricing, Weinberg, Kling, and Wilen’s (1993) consideration of water markets, and 
Weinberg and Kling’s (1996) attention to cross-policy effects. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the regional agricultural drainage problem.  In 
contrast to much of the work in this area, the analysis here simultaneously considers the major 
management strategies of source control, reuse, and disposal along with substitution possibilities 
that exist among them.
1  A stylized theoretical model is developed to identify conditions when 
freshwater crop production, reuse, and evaporation ponds are viable options.  Circumstances that 
determine the choice of reuse or evaporation ponds as the preferred disposal method are also 
investigated.  Sensitivity of these options to changes in water management and environmental 
concerns is performed. 
Two policy schemes are then evaluated with respect to their potential impact on the market 
solution.  One scheme consists of charging or compensating growers for additions to or 
extractions from the water table, respectively.  The second scheme consists of a permit system 
where permit supply and demand is generated by extractions from and additions to the water 
table, respectively.  Both schemes are shown to result in a competitive equilibrium and 
hydrologic balance.  These results suggest that a high level of agricultural production may be 
possible for some period of time while still maintaining environmental quality.  It should be 
noted that the novelty of our policy analysis within the environmental economics literature is the 
endogeneity of the emissions and permit supply beyond just the allocation across emitters.
2 
Finally, an empirical analysis is conducted for a region of the SJV, a region that is currently 
heavily impacted by drainage problems.  The intention of including the empirical section is not 
                                                 
1  The few available previous regional/integrated studies are empirical and primarily concern efficient  
management.   




to provide an all-encompassing analysis of the theoretical results, but rather illustrate the 
importance of accounting for each of the major management options – source control, reuse, and 
in-region disposal – so as to accurately reflect the problem, substitution possibilities, and 
consequences confronts growers and policy makers.  Our findings indicate that overlooking any 
of these options, and the substitution opportunities that exist among them, can have a substantial 
impact on the results and, henceforth, the conclusions one can drawn about the relative 
attractiveness and efficiency of any particular policy scheme. 
 
Model 
Consider a region with irrigated agricultural production overlying a shallow, saline water 
table and no facilities for external drainage.  Agricultural production is modeled consisting of 
three sectors: freshwater crop production, reuse production, and drainage disposal via 
evaporation ponds.  Within the theoretical framework, land allocation and water applications are 
variable; the empirical analysis includes alternate irrigation systems and crop mix as additional 
choice variables.  Land and water allocations are chosen to maximize regional net benefits 
subject to both land and hydrologic balance constraints.  The latter constraint requires that flows 
to the water table are balanced by flows from the water table, an important assumption that 
eliminates the possibility of the water table rising to levels that damage crop or eliminate 
production. 
Regional net benefits, ￿ ($/yr), are given by  
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where  = i w  applied water depth (ft/yr),  = i x  land area (acres),  = i y  annual crop yield (per acre), 





i p  are defined for crops, c, and water, w, for i = {1,2}.   1 g  and  2 g  are annual per acre 
production costs, 
2
2 2x g  are other costs associated with reuse, and  3 g represents evaporation pond 
costs ($/ac-ft).  Other reuse costs may include additional production costs, land quality effects, or 
risk and uncertainty factors associated with experience growing reuse crops.  The quadratic 
specification follows along the insight of Howitt (1995) who suggests that for most crops, profit 
functions might be modeled as nonlinear in land to capture a decreasing gross margin per acre.    
The crop-water production functions are given by 
    ( ) i i i w f y =  and  ( ) i i i w g d =     (2) 
where di are deep percolation flows (ft/yr) for i = 1,2, implying crop yield and deep percolation 
flows are a function of applied water depth.  The land constraint is 
  1 3 2 1 £ + + x x x                                     (3) 
where a unit regional area is assumed for convenience.  To maintain hydrologic balance in the 
region, the following condition is assumed: 
      3 2 2 2 2 1 1 x e x w x d x d
p £ - +                       (4) 
where e
p is the pond evaporation rate (ft/yr).  This implies that deep percolation flows below the 
rootzone must be less than disposals through reuse or evaporation in the pond. 
 
Optimal management and shadow values 
In this section, the first-order conditions associated with maximizing regional net benefits are 
identified.  Particular attention is given to the importance of all three management options in 
achieving efficiency.  To keep the analysis tractable, the choice variables are land acreage 




water application for both crop production and reuse.  A succeeding section will analyze variable 
water applications. 
Let  1 1 1 1 1 1 w p y p
w c - - = g p  and  2 2 2 2 2 2 w p y p
w c - - = g p  be the annual net returns per acre 
from crop and reuse production respectively before drainage and land costs.  Let l l  ($/ac-ft) 
and d l  ($/ac-ft) denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the land constraint (3) and the 
hydrologic balance constraint (4), respectively.  Forming the Lagrangian and differentiating 
yields 
  l d d l l p + £ 1 1                                                      (5) 
  l d d d w x l l l g p + £ + - 2 2 2 2 2 2                               (6) 
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1 3 l g
l
+
£                                                   (7) 
as the first-order conditions associated with x1, x2 , and x3  respectively.  Each of these conditions 
must hold with equality when the associated land variable is positive.  Furthermore, the shadow 
values must be non-negative (Sydsaeter, Strom, Berck 2000). 
The first two conditions imply that crop and reuse production are carried out to the point 
where the marginal net returns are equal to the marginal costs of drainage plus land opportunity 
costs.  As shown in equation (6), part of the benefit of reuse is associated with the water 
extractions, which are valued by ld.  Equation (7) implies that drainage disposal by evaporation 
ponds is produced to the point where the marginal benefits of disposal equal the marginal costs; 
the latter including both pond construction and environmental costs along with the opportunity 




Assuming crop production is sufficiently profitable to be grown, condition (5) implies that 
the shadow value of land equals crop revenue less all other costs including drainage.  Condition 
(6) implies 
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l                                            (8) 
where (w2–d2) is the evaporation rate of the reuse area.  Thus the shadow price of drainage 
consists of production costs net of crop returns (if any) and a land opportunity cost.  For any 
positive x1, equation (7) or (8) must hold with equality to meet the disposal requirements 
associated with the deep percolation flows, d1x1. 
A comparison of equations (7) and (8), for instance, illustrates the importance of recognizing 
all three management options in efforts to identify an efficient solution.  Assuming w2-d2 < e
p, as 
will typically be the case, implies that the shadow prices associated with the two disposal 
methods will depend on the shadow value of land.  This comparison is depicted in Figure 1.  
Under the assumed conditions, reuse is the less costly disposal option when land values are low 
while the evaporation pond is preferable when land values are high.  This tradeoff arises because 
while reuse may be less costly per-acre than evaporation ponds (and quite possibly have positive 
returns), it also disposes of less water per acre than evaporation ponds.  Hence, choice of 
disposal method depends in part on the profitability of crop production with freshwater, 
something which might otherwise have appeared independent. 
 
Land Allocations 
Under what circumstances might positive levels of x1, x2, and x3 be observed?  First, consider 
the necessary conditions for x1 >0.  From (5) and the non-negativity of shadow value on land, it 




d d l p 1 1 ‡                                   (9) 
As mentioned above, positive crop production requires some drainage disposal via reuse, 
evaporation pond, or both.  If the reuse area, x2, is positive, then equation (6) and a non-negative 
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For analogous reasoning, a positive evaporation pond area, x3, implies 
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p             (12) 
when crop production is positive.  If p1 is less than this amount, any positive x1 would be 
inefficient. 
Assuming a positive level of x1, under what conditions might x2 > 0?  Efficiency 
requirements for positive levels of x1 and x2 require equations (5) and (6) hold with equality.  
From equations (6) and (7) it follows that 
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again assuming e
p > w2 –d2 .  This and the non-negativity of  2 g  yield 
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as a necessary condition for a positive x2.  If this condition is not satisfied, that is, if the cost per 




reuse cannot be socially efficient.  Note that this is only a minimally necessary condition; 
sufficiency also requires a relatively small land value as previously illustrated. 
 Analogously, if crop production is positive, when would we observe x3 > 0?  Here both 
(5) and (7) must hold as equalities.  These imply  
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The first-order condition (6) and the shadow value of land from (5) result in 
     ( ) 2 2 1
1 2 2 2 2
d w d
x




l                          (16) 
as an upper bound on the shadow value of drainage.  Combining these two results yields 
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    (17) 
as a necessary condition for x3 > 0.  If this condition is violated, evaporation ponds are an 
economically inferior disposal strategy relative to reuse. 
Hence, the above analysis illustrates that efforts to find an efficient solution to irrigated 
drainage problem in a region such as the SJV require recognition of the intricate links that exist 
between source control, reuse, and in-region disposal.  Analyses that overlook any one of these 
factors are likely to lead to either environmentally and economically unsustainable practices or 
inefficient outcomes.   
 
Environmental hazards of evaporation ponds 
Having identified necessary conditions for observing positive levels of x1, x2, and x3, 
sensitivity of these activities to changes in relevant parameters is now considered.  Recently, in-




hazards associated with evaporation ponds.  Drainage flows leach highly toxic trace elements 
from the soil profile.  The concentration of these elements in evaporation ponds may build up 
over time as the water evaporates.  Within the western U.S., evidence of increases in selenium 
levels within these ponds has been documented.  Selenium is extremely toxic to birds and other 
wildlife.  The deformities associated with chicks in the SJV were linked to selenium and 
ultimately prompted the closure of the Kesterson Reservoir as a drainage disposal area. 
To investigate the impact of a change in in-region disposal requirements, the effect of a 
change in g3 on xi is evaluated.  Increases in g3 might arise from requiring netting on the ponds, 
and/or requiring additional compensating habitat for every acre of evaporation pond.
3  In the 
following analysis, we assume positive amounts of crop production, reuse, and evaporation pond 
are efficient, and that the land and drainage constraints (3) and (4) are both binding.  These two 
constraints can be solved for x2 and x3 as functions of x1 and then substituted into (1) leaving net 
benefits as a function of x1.  Differentiating with respect to x1 yields the respective first-order 
condition.  Differentiating with respect to g3 and solving yields 
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under the likely assumptions that w2 > d2 and e
p > w2 - d2.  Using definitions for x2 and x3 derived 
from the land and drainage constraints, it follows that 
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assuming, again, the likely conditions that w2 > d2 and e
p > w2 - d2. 
 An increase in the environmental costs associated with evaporation ponds results in a 
smaller pond area.  Reuse area must expand to compensate.  Since reuse typically disposes less 
water per unit area than evaporation ponds, more total land area is required for disposal and 
hence primary crop production must decline.  Sensitivity analysis can be conducted for other 
parameters in an analogous manner.  Clearly, different net outcomes may occur when other 
factors such as applied water rates, irrigation systems, and crop type are allowed to vary.  
Empirically, which factors vary will be application specific.  In the empirical model below, all of 
these factors are choice variables. 
 
Water applications and environmental hazards 
This section identifies the efficiency requirements associated with freshwater and reuse water 
applications, both of which are now considered choice variables.  Following the identification of 
the first order efficiency conditions, we briefly investigate the implications on water use of 
changes in the costs of in-region disposal.  
From equations (1) - (4), the first-order conditions for water applications are  
   ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 w g p w f p d
w c ¢ + = ¢ l                            (21) 
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for w1 and w2, respectively.  The first-order conditions for the land allocations and the shadow 
values for land and drainage disposal are defined in equations (5) – (8).  Given a positive amount 
of crop production and drainage reuse, water applications are assumed to be strictly positive. 
In equation (21), w1 has the usual interpretation that water is applied to the point where the 
marginal value in production equals the marginal cost, which includes both water and drainage 
costs.  In the case of reuse, equation (22), the marginal benefit of water applications includes 
both the value of crop production and drainage reduction.  For efficiency, reuse water is applied 
(and extracted) until these marginal benefits equal the marginal costs of the water itself, 
w p2 , and 
the corresponding deep percolation flows,  ( ) 2 2 w g d
¢ l .   
Given these efficiency conditions, consider again a change in the cost of in-region disposal 
that might come about through efforts to reduce the environmental hazards associated with 
evaporations ponds.  For tractability purposes, we suppose x2 = 0.  With the land and drainage 
constraints holding with equality, land areas x1 and x3 can be rewritten as functions of w1.  
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which is less than zero under the (realistic) assumption that drainage flows are convex in applied 
water (i.e.,  ) ( ' 1 1 w g > 0).  Applying this to the land area relations implies that the land areas x1 




In regions with high water tables, deep percolation flows from one field may have negative 
impacts on production or the environment elsewhere in the region, perhaps even imposing 
additional disposal costs on others growers.  Conversely, extractions from the high water table 
may lead to substantial benefits elsewhere in the system.  Absent regulation, these costs and 
benefits may be largely or entirely borne by other users of the resource; hence unregulated use is 
likely inefficient. 
One possible regulatory strategy is to price flows to and from the water table.  Consider a 
market consisting of three types of agents: crop producers who use freshwater, crop producers 
who reuse water via extractions from the watertable, and pond operators who provide disposal 
services.  Freshwater crop producers maximize profits, ￿1, subject to a charge on emissions, 
    ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 x d p x w p x p x y p d
w
l
c - - - - = P g                      (25) 
where pd ($/ft) is the regulatory price charged to producers for deep percolation flows and paid to 
producers for disposal of these flows, and pl ($/acre) is the land rental rate.  Reusers also 
maximize profits, ￿2, subject to the charge on additions to the watertable, but also receive 
payments for extractions from the water table,  
                                                 
4 It should also be mentioned that changes in environmental costs brought about by changes in land 
requirements (e.g., requirement a compensating habitat) will add additional complexity to the 
theoretical model by essentially influencing both the land and hydrological balance constraints.  This 
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Finally, pond operators are paid for water table extractions implying  
     3 3 3 3 ) ( x p x e p l
p
d - - = P g                                 (27) 
for their regional profits.  If we let  d d p l =  and  l l p l = , then the private-optimum first-order 
conditions derived from equations (25) - (27) are identical to the social optima first-order 
conditions derived earlier.  With many operators, land prices will be determined in a competitive 
market.  Given the regulator sets the efficient water charge, pd, the correct land value will 
automatically emerge. 
An alternative to a pricing scheme is to establish a market for the unpriced services.  Under 
marketable permit system, reusers and evaporation pond operators supply permits, while 
emissions to the water table must be covered by a permit.  As illustrated in Figure 2, a 
competitive equilibrium will occur where the quantity of permits supplied equals quantity 
demanded.  Such an outcome achieves hydrologic balance.  Assuming that  d d p l =  and  l l p l = , 
it is straightforward to show that the conditions for equilibrium implied by equations (25) – (27), 
along with the market clearing conditions in both the permit market and the land market, will be 
identical to the social optimal conditions.  Hence, an economically efficient competitive 
equilibrium exists with the permit system. 
The novelty of these approaches as compared to the standard emission charge and TDP 
market schemes in environmental economics is that in the above example, the level of emissions 
and permit supply are endogenous.  In the standard approach, an overall level of environmental 
quality would be specified and this level would determine a fixed level of aggregate pollution 




While the regulator does specify the level of environmental quality in terms of maintaining a 
hydrologic balance in the present scenario, the actual total level of emissions is not targeted. 
 
Empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis focuses on the Westlands Water District (WWD) within California’s 
Central Valley.  WWD consists of approximately 600,000 acres located in the agriculturally rich 
San Joaquin Valley and is subject to an in-region drainage disposal requirement.  A large portion 
of WWD confronts a high water table, the result of continued deep percolation flows from 
irrigation accumulating over time on top of the relatively impermeable Corcoran clay layer.  
Selected parameter values are described in Table 1.  For a complete description of the model, 
parameters, and estimation procedures, see Kan, Schwabe, and Knapp (2002). 
The model includes cotton, processing tomatoes, wheat, alfalfa, and lettuce as both 
freshwater crops and reuse water crops.  Bermuda grass is an additional reuse crop.  The 
irrigation systems and their respective Christensen Uniformity Coefficient (CUC) are furrow 0.5 
mile (CUC=70), furrow 0.25 mile (CUC=75), linear move sprinklers (CUC=85), sprinkler 
(CUC=80), low-energy precise application system (CUC=90), and subsurface drip (CUC=90).
5 
Crop-water production functions are specified as 
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5  A measure of the uniformity of water application for an irrigation system is its Christensen Uniformity 




where e (ft/yr) denotes evapotranspiration, e  (ft/yr) is the maximum evapotranspiration under 
non-stressed conditions, e represents the minimum evapotranspiration level required for yield 
production, y is yield (tons/acre), and d (ft/y) is deep percolation flows.  y’s and a’s are scalars, 
while w (ft/yr) and c (ds/m) are irrigation depth and salt concentration.  This system is estimated 
for each crop-irrigation system combination.  Data for yield, evapotranspiration, and deep-
percolation flows given irrigation depth and salt concentration are generated using the Letey et 
al. (1985) plant-level model and assuming water is distributed over the field according to a 
lognormal distribution.  Plant-level parameter values for the model are generally from Letey and 
Dinar (1986); distribution moments depend on irrigation system uniformity.  The production 
function system was fit to the data using nonlinear regression analysis. 
Non-water production costs and market prices for each cropping system are derived from UC 
Cooperative Extension Service (2000) crop budgets and Fresno County Crop Report (2000).    
The costs of irrigation include amortized capital costs along with maintenance and operating 
costs.  Surface water costs are a weighted-average of water prices in WWD.  Constraints are 
imposed to maintain acreages of individual crops within historical ranges observed in the 1990’s. 
Evaporation pond construction and maintenance costs are $117.40 ac
-1 yr
-1 and the 
evaporation rate is 5.32 ft/yr (Posnikoff and Knapp 1997).  In-region disposal consists of 
evaporation ponds and their requisite compensating habitat.  Given the potential environmental 
damages associated with evaporation ponds, in particular the danger to birds from selenium 
buildup in the ponds, the state of California requires pond owners provide additional freshwater 
(compensating) habitat at a 1:1 ratio to evaporation pond acreage.  Furthermore, various bird 
hazing techniques must be used on the evaporation ponds to discourage birds from feeding and 
nesting there.  Compensating habitat costs are estimated as $1,504 ac
-1 yr




mandated 1:1 ratio imposed in 1995 has been questioned as perhaps going beyond what is 
needed to protect wildlife (Evaporation Ponds Technical Committee 1999). 
The first column in Table 2 reports results with no constraints on net flows to the water table.   
This serves as a baseline for the hydrologic balance analysis and also to help verify the model.  
In effect, it represents the situation in WWD prior to 1985 when growers were allowed to 
discharge their drainage into nearby streams, rivers, or canals.  As the results indicate, traditional 
irrigation systems are selected, there is no reuse, and deep percolation flows average slightly 
over 1 ft/yr.  Interestingly, deep percolation flows of 1 ft/yr are generally considered to be the 
historical average in the region over the period time during which the current drainage problem 
developed. 
The second column in Table 2 enforces the hydrologic balance constraint but with no reuse.  
This scenario mimics the WWD after the in-region disposal requirement but before the 
compensating habitat and hazing mandates imposed in 1995.  The results suggest that efficient 
management entails both a substantial level of source control as well as in-region disposal of 
deep percolation flows to evaporation ponds.  Total crop area declines to accommodate the 
evaporation ponds.  Irrigation systems switch from traditional systems (furrow with ½ mile runs) 
to more uniform systems.  Average deep percolation flows decline by almost 60% due to both 
improvements in irrigation efficiency as well as reductions in applied water for a given system.  
The pond area amounts to 7% of the regional area.  While the results show that significant 
returns to land and management can be sustained while maintaining hydrologic balance, social 
net benefits (SNB) decline by 17% compared to the unconstrained case. 
In column three, the compensating habitat requirement is introduced intended to mimic 




irrigation systems that lead to a pronounced reduction in deep percolation flows by 12% as 
compared to the unconstrained case.  Pond acreage has been reduced by 5%, some of which was 
needed for the compensating habitat.  While still positive, SNB decrease by nearly 37% as 
compared to column one. 
The last column of Table 2 allows growers the choice of evaporation ponds (including 
compensating habitats) and/or reuse as a drainage disposal option.  The results suggest that 
drainwater reuse offers great promise in maintaining agricultural production and hydrologic 
balance in the region.  As shown, the area devoted to crop production with freshwater is reduced 
quite substantially to allow for reuse production.  Compared to the baseline solution, reuse 
opportunities require little source control from growers.  There is a 5% reduction only in the use 
of the less uniform irrigation systems and, surprisingly, deep percolation flows increase slightly.  
While the details of the crop mix for freshwater crops is not shown, column three does 
illustrate that most of the drainwater reuse is applied to cotton.  The constraint on total cotton 
acreage was binding at the upper bound of its observed historical levels, implying that additional 
acreage would lead to even larger gains.  Cotton as a reuse crop is practical since it is both 
profitable and moderately salt tolerant (Mass and Hoffman 1977).  In the presence of the reuse 
option, no evaporation ponds where chosen.  Most noteworthy, though, is that with reuse the net 
returns to land and management are not only positive – implying that agriculture can be 
sustained in the region for some time - but are only 5% below the unconstrained case. 
The last row in Table 2 reports the shadow values on drainage disposal, ld.  These vary 
widely depending on the assumed conditions; however, the most realistic estimate at the present 
time would be that with reuse ($19/ac-ft).  This would be the emission charge imposed by the 




for extractions from the water table.  For crop production, this would imply a payment of $23/ac-
yr given average deep percolation flows of 1.21/ft-yr.  This shadow value could also serve as an 
initial estimate to initialize grower planning under a permit market.  Linking these results to the 
theory, and specifically equations (7) and (8) and Figure 1, we might expect that since reuse is 
the preferable disposal method the opportunity cost of land is low.  These results are driven, in 
part, by the profits from using reuse water on cotton, a profitable alternative that lowers the 
opportunity cost of foregoing freshwater crops.   
 
Conclusions 
A variety of drainage disposal options are available for agricultural drainwater management 
in semi-closed basins; the broad categories include source control, reuse, and disposal in 
evaporation ponds or other means.  The theoretical analysis demonstrates that the efficient choice 
of these options depends on a variety of parameter values and will undoubtedly vary from one 
locale to another.  Furthermore, the choice of management strategies is interrelated and so, in 
principle, an integrated analysis as developed here is necessary. 
Some level of source control is efficient since deep percolation flows generate disposal costs 
and/or environmental damages.  Absent reuse, a very high level of source control is efficient due 
to the relatively high cost associated with evaporation ponds.  This is accomplished largely 
through adoption of highly uniform/high-cost irrigation systems.  With reuse allowed, the 
primary form of source control is reduction in land area devoted to freshwater production; the 
released land goes into reuse production. 
Maintaining hydrologic balance, and hence sustainability, requires that deep percolation 




demonstrates the trade-offs involved in choosing between these two strategies.  Reuse may 
generate positive net returns per acre of production.  Yet even if reuse production generates 
negative returns per acre, the costs per acre will typically be less than that of a pond.  
Additionally, the environmental implications are likely to be less costly with reuse.  However, 
evaporation ponds are likely to generate more net drainage disposal per-acre than reuse thus 
making the opportunity cost of land in freshwater crop production a critical component driving 
the efficient choice of disposal.  As equations (7) and (8) along with Figure 1 illustrated, when 
the opportunity cost of land is high, ponds have a comparative advantage relative to reuse.  
Alternatively, low opportunity costs favor reuse.  
In the empirical analysis, reuse appears to be an extremely promising solution to the drainage 
problem.  Maximizing regional net benefits while maintaining hydrologic balance seems best 
achieved with reuse and minimal source control thereby avoiding the expense and environmental 
implications associated with evaporation ponds.  This strategy, though, requires a reduction in 
freshwater crop acreage for reuse production.  Given the profitability of cotton as a reuse crop 
capable of enduring moderately high salt concentrations clearly reduces the opportunity costs of 
foregone freshwater crop production.   
One facet of the empirical results that should be emphasized is that potentially large net 
returns can be achieved while maintaining overall hydrologic balance in the system with the 
reuse strategy.  These are promising results that may help better inform growers within the 
region who are confronting ever-increasing costs of disposal and policy makers searching for 
more efficient solutions that are both sustainable and environmentally friendly.  These 
conclusions, though, are conditioned in part on the existing salt concentration of the water table.  




nature of the large-scale hydrologic regime.  Furthermore, real-world outcomes will also depend 
on such elements as land quality, crop rotations, risk, grower knowledge, and a variety of other 
factors not considered here. 
Whether agricultural production can be sustainable in a semi-closed basin while maintaining 
adequate levels of environmental quality is probably best answered with a dynamic analysis that 
is well beyond the scope of this study.  The dynamics involve groundwater hydrology, including 
possible further increases in salt concentration, as well as possible buildup of human and 
physical capital, which might substitute in full or part for hydrologic degradation.  The empirical 
analysis does suggest, though, that a high level of agricultural production may be possible for 
some period of time while still maintaining environmental quality. 
From a policy perspective, the common property nature of the drainage problem in the SJV 
seems suitable for some sort of collective action.  One possibility is a pricing scheme.  Under this 
scheme, growers are charged for deep percolations flows to the water table, while reusers and 
pond operators are compensated for extractions from the water table.  Setting the charge at the 
correct level will induce hydrologic balance; this also implies revenue-neutrality.  For the 
empirical example considered here, the estimated drainage price was $19/af, a relatively modest 
amount.  This shadow value was shown to be quite sensitive to the disposal options.  Given the 
heavy reliance on reuse in the efficient solution, and the risk and uncertainties surrounding this 
strategy, it is likely that the true value is somewhat higher. 
The other policy we briefly discussed was a marketable permit system.  As in standard 
environmental economics, emissions to the water table need to be covered by a permit and the 
permits are freely tradable.  A novelty of the scheme here, however, is that permit supply is 




implies hydrologic balance.  Under competitive conditions in both the permit and land markets, 
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Table 1.  Price, Cost, and Production Data 
Crop prices & harvest costs  Cotton  Tomato  Lettuce  Wheat  Alfalfa  Bermuda
-grass 
Output Prices ($/ton)
a  1489.7  55.2  596.5  133.3  109.3  75.2 
General harvest costs ($/ac)  61.0  54.9  0.0  0.0  95.0  131.2 
Yield related costs ($/ton)  0.04  12.7  232.6  29  13.3  15.0 








Sprinkler  LEPA  Linear  Drip 
Christensen Uniformity Coefficient  70  75  80  85  90  90 
Pressure head (ft)  10  10  150  50  80  50 
Capital Recovery Costs ($/ac/yr)  21.9  28.8  42.7  81.7  81.8  178.1 
O & M Costs ($/ac/yr)  2.9  3.8  20.0  38.3  38.4  60.0 
Fixed energy costs ($/ac/yr)  1.0  1.0  1.5  1.0  1.2  1.0 
Pressurization cost ($/ac-ft)  1.1  1.1  16.5  5.5  8.8  5.5 
Nonwater production costs
c             
Cotton ($/ac/yr)  607.8  628.1  678.5  683.1  680.3  744.9 
Tomato ($/ac/yr)  636.8  661.2  718.8  704.9  701.5  751.2 
Lettuce ($/ac/yr)  1652.1  1683.4  1729.6  1717.8  1700.5  1661.3 
Wheat ($/ac/yr)  194.8  204.5  235.5  288.6  286.9  390.9 
Alfalfa ($/ac/yr)  396.8  409.9  434.6  492.3  483.2  538.6 
Bermudagrass ($/ac/yr)  507.1  541.6  609.8  557.3  548.8  627.2 
a  Average price per ton of cotton lint and tomatoes in Westlands Water District, California 1997-1999. 
b  University of California Committee of Consultants (1988), and Posnikoff and Knapp.  All costs are in 1999 dollars.  
Capital recovery costs assume a 5% interest rate. Furrow and drip irrigation systems are assumed to have a 5 and 8 
years life expectancy, respectively.   
c  Non-water production costs include costs associated with seed, land preparation, planting, machinery, fertilizer, etc.  
Opportunity cost of land and cash overhead is not included. Data come from University of California Cooperative 























     No CH   
 



























































































































Wheat / F4 
 


































































































































































Figure 2- Drainage permit market with endogenous supply and demand. 
p
d
D = d 1x 1+ d 2x 2
S = w 2x 1+ e
px 3